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Abstract 
Reducing public sector deficits and high debt burdens in part will require an increase in net exports – 
which is only possible if the countries concerned are able to produce goods and services that are 
‘competitive’ on world markets. Policies aimed at enhancing competitiveness may be offset by actions 
taken in other countries and can generate negative international pecuniary spillovers.  This paper 
discusses different approaches towards dealing with (perceived) cross-border externalities. In many 
cases there will be a significant degree of uncertainty as what the net effects of policies are, taking into 
account the overall impact of policy measures that have a bearing on firm-level competitiveness.  A 
case is for greater cooperation to enhance the transparency of applied policies; assess their impacts and 
establish mechanisms to consult and exchange information. 
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Introduction* 
Competitiveness concerns are front and center in the economic sections of newspapers around the 
world. Improving competitiveness is a key objective for policymakers in Europe but is equally central 
in policy debates in the United States (Porter and Rivkin, 2012). Many high-income countries confront 
an urgent need to reduce public sector deficits and pay down high debt burdens that increased rapidly 
following the 2008 financial crisis. In part this will require an increase in net exports – which is only 
possible if the countries concerned are able to produce goods and services that are ‘competitive’ on 
world markets. The extent to which this can be realized will depend primarily on economic policy 
reforms by the countries concerned. A complicating factor is that such measures will be (are) pursued 
by many countries, so that whatever a government seeks to do to improve the competitiveness of firms 
based in its territory may be offset to a greater or lesser extent by actions that are taken in other 
countries. Moreover, the policies that governments pursue may generate negative international 
pecuniary spillovers. The effect of economic policies and regulatory measures implemented by a given 
jurisdiction on the firms located in other jurisdictions has long been the focus of debate and 
controversy. Actual or perceived spillover effects may motivate reactive (retaliatory) policies and 
become the focus of efforts to negotiate agreed rules of the game.   
An influential strand of the economic theory of trade agreements is premised on the notion that the 
motivation for governments to negotiate trade agreements is to internalize the externalities that are 
created by the unilateral use of trade-related policies (i.e., terms of trade effects). The set of such 
policies is large, and extends well beyond the traditional focus of trade negotiators on tariffs and 
quotas that are applied at the border. While economists view trade agreements and international 
cooperation as driven by terms of trade externalities and/or political economy factors (trade 
agreements as commitment mechanisms), politicians, business people and civil society more generally 
often tend to frame concerns regarding the effects of policy measures taken by foreign countries in 
terms of the impact on the competitiveness of national industry. Abstracting from the current 
economic challenges confronting countries with unsustainable debt burdens and government budget 
deficits, competitiveness is a key focus of policy debates the world over, reflecting the recognition that 
in open societies the survival and growth of firms – and thus the creation of employment opportunities 
for the workforce – depends on their ability to increase their productivity. Many policies may affect 
the competitiveness of firms, either directly, or more frequently, indirectly.  
“Competitiveness concerns” have been a staple feature of efforts to cooperate on economic 
policies, especially in the context of trade agreements and formal economic integration efforts. Indeed, 
one driver of such agreements has been to “level the playing field” for firms located in the 
participating countries. A recurring conundrum has been what policies to include; what should remain 
sovereign and what should become subject to common disciplines. During the period leading to the 
creation of the EEC, Jelle Zijlstra, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, argued that tariff removal 
also required “common policies on taxes, wages, prices and employment policy” (Milward, 1992, p. 
188) in order for firms to have a level playing field. Similarly, the Belgian coal mining industry argued 
in the late 1940s that a common market could only be accepted if German wage and social security 
costs were raised to Belgian levels. French officials persistently demanded policy harmonization in the 
social area—equal pay for both sexes, a uniform working week—as a precondition for trade 
liberalization (French standards in this area were higher than in other countries) (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2009).  
                                                     
*
 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 12th World Trade Forum conference, “The Rule of Law in Monetary 
Affairs: Lessons from the Trade Field,” World Trade Institute, Bern, October 11-12, 2012. I am grateful to Petros 
Mavroidis, Jose Guilherme Reis and Anirudh Shingal for helpful comments. 
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The European Union is the most far-reaching economic integration initiative extant involving 
sovereign states. Many policy areas that are excluded from shallower trade agreements are covered. 
Notwithstanding the depth of the European integration effort, however, there are very large differences 
in the competitiveness of the firms and industries located in different EU member states. The same is 
true for countries that are not parties to integration agreements – and in practice, notwithstanding the 
large number of PTAs that are in force, much global trade takes place between countries that do not 
have PTAs. Bilateral trade between the EU, US, Japan and China does not occur under the auspices of 
PTAs as none of the four entities have a PTA with each other.  These stylized facts suggest that there 
exists substantial scope for countries to pursue greater cooperation (‘deep integration’), but the 
example of the EU and the Euro zone illustrates that moving down this track – even if it proves to be 
feasible – will not necessarily remove or address competitiveness concerns. 
Different approaches can be envisaged in dealing with (perceived) cross-border negative pecuniary 
spillovers created by policies in addition to reactive domestic policies. International law is one option. 
Others include “soft law” forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation and delegation to independent 
entities that are given a transparency and analysis mandate—e.g., tasked with assessing whether and 
how large any negative spillovers are. In many cases there will be a significant degree of uncertainty 
as what the net effects of policies are, taking into account the overall impact of the relevant policy 
measures that have a bearing on firm-level competitiveness.  A precondition for agreement on binding 
international rules is a shared recognition that the negative spillovers associated with a policy (set of 
policies) are significant and that a specific set of disciplines will result in greater efficiency (lower 
costs).  At present there is no such recognition when it comes to important policy areas that generate 
negative competitiveness spillovers. An implication is that countries need to work towards putting in 
place the preconditions for stronger forms of international cooperation—by improving the 
transparency of applied policies; supporting independent analysis of the effects of policies; and 
establishing mechanisms through which governments can consult and exchange information. 
1. Competitiveness and its determinants 
The term “competitiveness” is widely used and many definitions have been suggested. Economists 
tend to take the view that competitiveness is a notion that applies at the level of an enterprise, whereas 
many commentators and pundits apply the concept to territories – cities, provinces, regions, and 
nations. Krugman (1994) has argued forcefully that the concept should not be applied to nations. 
Countries do not compete, firms do, and a focus on competitiveness at the national level can very 
easily result in an incorrect and perverse zero-sum view of international exchange (De Grauwe, 2010). 
Firms compete in global markets, with some firms winning (expanding their profits and growing) at 
the expense of other firms that lose market share, are forced to contract and may go bankrupt. At the 
firm level there are winners and losers, but for countries as a whole the competitive process is welfare-
enhancing. That said, it is important for policy-makers to take a nation-level perspective of 
competitiveness because locational factors help shape firm-level competitiveness (positively or 
negatively) by determining the availability and cost of production inputs and operating and 
transactions costs. Competitiveness is the result of firms exploiting the sources of comparative 
advantage that prevail in a given location, many of which are endogenous in the sense of being the 
result of economic policies and institutions that have been put in place over time.  
Analysts often equate a country’s competitiveness with the real exchange rate (and changes in the 
real exchange rate over time), usually defined as the relative price of a basket of goods in two 
countries (consumer price index) or relative unit labor costs (Boltho, 1996). Another frequently used 
indicator is the (trend in) market (export) shares for a country (e.g., Del Gatto et al. 2012). Neither of 
these variables is necessarily informative about the determinants of either the level or changes of the 
indicators used, which is of course the key question for policy. Many factors can affect relative unit 
labor costs and the evolution of market share. The most broadly accepted definition of aggregate 
national competitiveness is total factor productivity (Porter, 1990). Delgado et al. (2012) define what 
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they term foundational competitiveness as the expected level of output per working-age individual 
(i.e., potential workers as opposed to those actually employed) given the overall quality of a country as 
a place to do business. The rate of increase in productivity determines the rates of return on 
investment, which in the aggregate determines economic growth rates in the longer run – the ability to 
generate greater output from any given supply of inputs.  In such a longer-run perspective, 
competitiveness will be a function of the ability of firms to allocate and deploy resources to the most 
productive, highest valued activities. This in turn will depend on the feasibility and cost of re-
allocating and re-deploying resources, with more productive firms expanding and others contracting or 
exiting. There is growing evidence that productivity differences within national industries is a major 
factor in determining cross-country productivity differences (Syverson, 2011; Altomonte, Aquilante 
and Ottaviano, 2012) and that the performance of services sectors plays an important role in this 
(Francois and Hoekman, 2010) . An implication is that competitiveness will be a function of the 
efficiency of product, labor and capital markets, as well as macroeconomic policies and  the 
availability and quality of public goods provided by governments (infrastructure, security of property 
rights, etc.).  
In a recent extensive empirical analysis and survey of the literature, Delgado et al. (2012) highlight 
three interrelated drivers of national competitiveness: (i) “social infrastructure” and political 
institutions, (ii) macroeconomic policy, and (iii) the microeconomic environment (including the 
business climate broadly defined to encompass factor markets, product market contestability, trade 
openness, physical infrastructure and the sophistication of company operations and strategy). All three 
are found to be significant drivers of competitiveness, but the last is argued to be most important in 
that it has the greatest impact on firm-level productivity. The other two broad drivers are economy-
wide in their impact—affecting all firms or broad groups of firms similarly. The 
business/microeconomic environment in contrast may have very differentiated impacts by influencing 
the ability of entrepreneurs to start new activities and the ease of expanding and contracting economic 
operations. Moreover, the relevant variables can be influenced by numerous actors, including 
municipal or regional governments, as opposed to primarily being determined by the central 
government.   
The approach taken by Porter and co-authors is very broad, spanning a large number of the relevant 
variables that affect competitiveness. Efforts to determine what matters from a more narrow trade 
perspective tend to take institutional and macroeconomic framework conditions as given and focus on 
policy areas that can be changed in the short run. The World Bank for example has developed a trade 
competitiveness policy toolkit that centers on three broad areas: economic policies that affect overall 
incentives; factors affecting operating costs; and policies that may be used to address national market 
failures (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Three pillars of trade competitiveness 
 
Source: Reis and Farole (2012). 
In operationalizing this framework the focus is on (i) the incentive framework for trade: anti-export 
biases created by trade and tax policy; the regulatory environment/investment climate confronting 
firms; and external market access conditions; (ii) factor inputs and trade costs: labor markets, skills, 
and the sophistication of management, accessibility and cost of production inputs, capital equipment, 
utilities, finance, and business services, as well as trade logistics and transport services; and (iii) 
proactive trade promotion policies: the capacity, incentives, and institutions that impact on innovation 
processes, standards and certification systems, and export and investment promotion mechanisms, 
including special customs regimes and economic zones, clusters and sector-specific support (industrial 
policy) (see Reis and Farole, 2012). Note that this more narrow focus on the determinants of trade 
competitiveness still spans a large number of policy areas, illustrating the challenge of identifying let 
alone agreeing on an international framework to “govern” the use of policies that impact on 
competitiveness.  
2. Competitiveness drivers and international spillovers 
The empirical literature on competitiveness and its determinants is informative as it helps to identify 
policies that impact on competitiveness. At the same time a problem from an international law or rule-
making perspective is that almost anything can matter for competitiveness. The problem is to 
determine what types of policies create the greatest negative pecuniary spillovers and where there is 
scope for international coordination to improve outcomes for all participating countries. The empirical 
literature suggests that the microeconomic environment  is key(Altomonte, Aquilante and Ottaviano, 
2012; Delgado et al, 2012), whereas the center of attention in policy debates on competitiveness 
spillovers is often on macroeconomic variables such as monetary policy, intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, or allegations that countries target recurring current account surpluses that in turn 
result in large global imbalances. Macroeconomic policies will shift incentives for the whole 
distribution of firms located in a country as opposed to targeting or affecting the growth of the most 
productive and innovative firms. Macroeconomic policy can have major impacts on export 
performance and economic growth and development in low-income countries with distorted domestic 
markets, but the literature on competitiveness suggests that good macroeconomic policy is a 
Aligning macro 
incentives
• Removing economic biases arising from tariff and non-tariff barriers, real exchange 
rate misalignment, and distortive tax regime; ensuring overall fiscal health of the 
economy, efficient labor market operation, product and factor market conditions, 
property rights protection, effective regulation, and ease of firm entry and exit
Improving backbone 
services and reducing 
transactions costs
• Improving backbone services and inputs such as energy, telecommunications, 
finance, and other services inputs; improving capacity and coordination of 
government agencies at the border, international transit arrangements, regional 
and multilateral agreements, and policy reforms that ensure more competitive 
markets for international transport, logistics, and other services that facilitate 
trade transactions
Proactive policies for 
overcoming 
government and 
market failures
• Promoting technology creation and adaptation, streamlining product standards 
and certifications, providing trade finance, supporting industry clusters, facilitating 
special economic zones and other spatial developments, and ensuring 
coordination of economic actors and linkages and spillovers to the local economy
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necessary, not a sufficient condition for competitiveness. What matters more (most) from an overall 
productivity growth perspective is the microeconomic incentive framework.   
Macroeconomic policies may generate negative spillovers if a country is large enough to affect 
world prices/interest rates. The export-driven growth strategy pursued by China with great success is 
often claimed to be a case in point, with critics arguing that China has pursued a policy mix that 
targets an undervalued exchange rate, subsidizing its exports to the detriment of employment in other 
countries (Bergsten and Gagnon, 2012). Exchange rates have often been the source of economic 
tension between trading partners. Countries that are running large current account deficits – that 
import much more than they export – frequently claim that surplus countries are “unfairly” 
manipulating the exchange rate so as to give their exporters a competitive advantage – increasing the 
domestic prices of imports and reducing the foreign currency denominated export prices. In the 1980s 
such claims were frequently made against Japan and the Asian “tigers”; in the 2000s it was the turn of 
China to bear the brunt of such complaints.  
A depreciation of the exchange rate can be equivalent to a combination of raising import tariffs for 
all traded goods and providing local firms with an across-the-board export subsidy. Governments have 
long been concerned with the possibility that a trading partner might pursue policies to engineer a 
depreciation of the exchange rate so as to undo trade liberalization commitments negotiated in trade 
agreements. Such concerns have become particularly prominent in recent years as a result of the build-
up of large current account surpluses and foreign exchange reserves by a number of countries, 
especially China. Perceptions that exchange rates are manipulated can generate pressures for 
protection by businesses that confront competition on both their home and export markets. More 
generally large swings in exchange rates can also have major impacts on debt service levels of 
countries that have borrowed in the affected currencies, giving rise to fiscal pressures. The rise in the 
US dollar in the 1980s was a factor in the debt crisis of that time and affected both debt restructuring 
and the required increase in net exports by borrowers.  
Whether major negative spillover effects are associated with specific policies is an empirical 
matter. In cases where there are negative pecuniary spillovers, a key issue is to disentangle intent from 
effects. To continue with the case of deliberate undervaluation of the exchange rate, this can be one 
element of a policy aimed at stimulating economic growth by increasing the profitability of the 
tradable sector in contexts where firms confront a bad investment climate and high operating costs as a 
result of domestic distortions (Rodrik, 2008). If there are also positive externalities associated with 
expanding exports of manufactures, measures such as currency depreciation may be welfare-
improving for the country concerned as well as the world as a whole (Eden and Nguyen, 2012). 
Freund and Pierola (2008) find that significant increases in manufactured exports that are sustained for 
at least 7 years (what they call export surges) in many developing countries were often preceded by a 
real devaluation of the exchange rate. This generates not just an expansion in existing exports but 
entry into new export products and new markets. The latter are important, accounting for 25 percent of 
export growth during the surge in developing countries. They argue that maintaining a competitive 
currency leads firms to expand the product and market space for exports, inducing a large reorientation 
of the tradable sector.
1
  
The cost and quality of numerous services inputs will affect the competitiveness of firms, as 
services are important elements of production and transactions costs. The costs of services may be 
increased as a result of limited competition that allows prices to reflect significant markups over costs.  
Actions to reduce these excess costs and improve quality will enhance the competitiveness of firms 
located in the markets concerned, with an aggregate effect that is akin to a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. If it is difficult to address the various distortions in an economy that give rise to excess 
                                                     
1
 Disentangling the two can be very difficult in practice, in that the objective of a policy may be to offset an externality, but 
the level of the instrument used is such that it goes beyond what is needed to do so. 
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costs for firms, it may be more straightforward to seek to depreciate the exchange rate as a way of 
offsetting (some of) the excess operating costs. There are many market failures that can have a 
negative effect on competitiveness of firms. A common example is credit constraints for small and 
medium sized firms—e.g., absence of financing for investment in new technology or new business 
lines—that prevent upgrading and the production of higher value-added products. While policy 
interventions should be targeted at the source of market failures, in the interim ‘compensating 
measures’ such as maintaining an undervalued exchange rate may help firms to exploit their 
competitive advantages.  
Maintaining a competitive real exchange rate is important for economic growth, but the national 
welfare case for targeting the exchange rate is premised on tradable sectors suffering 
disproportionately from market failures. Whether this is true is an empirical matter. The extent to 
which undervaluation will “work” in expanding net exports will depend on many factors, including the 
behavior of nominal wages (if these increase, the competitive impact will be undone), the ability of the 
monetary authorities to control inflationary effects (which can generate macroeconomic instability 
with associated costs that far outweigh what will be the temporary advantages given to exportables), 
the extent to which firms rely on imported inputs (in an increasingly supply chain driven world, a tax 
on imports is a direct tax on exports that embody the imports—so that the competiveness effects of a 
depreciation will be offset the higher is the degree of integration into global value chains and/or the 
import dependence of firms); the degree to which exporters hedge against foreign exchange risk; and 
the currency in which they invoice their products. All these factors matter for the effectiveness of the 
policy for the country pursuing it, and thus for any assessment of the extent to which there are 
negative spillovers for other countries. 
Deliberate policy intervention that aims at lowering the exchange rate can generate negative 
international competitiveness spillovers for competing exporting firms, but this is not the case for 
policies and institutions that incentivize firms to improve productivity performance. As mentioned, 
there is a large set of policies and institutions that have a bearing on productivity growth 
(competitiveness). Countries that put in place an appropriate enabling microeconomic environment – 
such as an innovation regime that encourages investment in human capital and R&D; a financial 
system that provides firms  with access to start-up equity capital and funding for expansion; actions to 
enhance competition on services markets so as to reduce the cost of services inputs and increase 
quality; corporate governance mechanisms that reward performance; an open trade and investment 
regime – will presumably experience higher productivity growth rates and generate more competitive 
firms that grow market share internationally. However, this does not constitute a negative spillover. 
The same is true for more fundamental determinants of national competitiveness that will take longer 
to change such as public health and educational attainment, or for factors that cannot be changed – 
such as location and natural endowments.  
Much can be learned from successful countries concerning what types of policies and institutions 
matter, but the fact that some countries do better than others is not a justification for the latter to argue 
that the actions put in place by the former are to their detriment. To the contrary – higher productivity 
performance and growth in successful nations creates greater economic opportunities for all countries, 
as long as markets are open. Less dynamic countries that are not able to put in place an incentive 
framework that supports competitiveness may have lower growth and GDP per capita, but that is the 
result of their own implicit or explicit choices. This is not to deny that policies that target specific 
industries or firms can generate negative international spillovers. However, the policies and 
institutional factors identified in the literature as drivers of competitiveness are not sector- or product-
specific but focus on activities that are “general inputs” into productivity growth. Common examples 
would be designing the tax regime so as to generate incentives for R&D investments and actions to 
ensure (greater) availability of finance and venture capital, as well as measures to ensure that markets 
are contestable so as to facilitate expansion by dynamic firms into new activities and to grow. 
Global Governance of International Competitiveness Spillovers’ 
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3. Some implications for international cooperation 
Generally applicable regulation and other government policies that affect relative prices for firms will 
affect competitiveness. But for there to be a case for seeking to agree on international rules there need 
to be spillovers—terms of trade externalities—or coordination failures that result in prisoner’s 
dilemma type inefficient outcomes. There also needs to be clarity on the policies that generate the 
externalities – it is not enough to point to outcomes such as current account surpluses or large bilateral 
trade imbalances as these can be the result of many factors of a structural nature as well as policies. As 
discussed below, this is a major problem when it comes to thinking about what rules might be 
appropriate and what remedy to apply in cases where such rules are found to be violated. Thus, 
international cooperation may be difficult to achieve. Even if specific policies can be identified, 
coordination or harmonization may not enhance national economic welfare, especially if specific 
outcomes (e.g., current account balances) reflect aggregate savings and investment behavior and/or 
differences across countries in social preferences, demographics, and so forth.  
In many of the policy areas that are the focus of attention in “competitiveness” policy debates, 
differences in policies — e.g., with respect to labor standards, social security or similar forms of 
regulation—may not affect the ability of firms to compete on world markets. If firms in “high labor 
standards” countries can ensure that the incidence of the implicit tax is borne by workers—that is, that 
the work force pays for the resulting benefits through lower wages—labor costs may be unaffected 
(Ehrenberg, 1994). Moreover, insofar as the cost-raising effects of worker’s rights cannot be fully 
shifted to workers, the resulting increase in product prices (due to higher costs) will put pressure on 
the exchange rate (because foreign demand for exports falls as prices increase, all other things equal). 
The resulting depreciation will lower the standard of living by raising the cost of imports. While the 
whole economy thus bears the burden of the higher standards, the exchange rate adjustment allows 
firms to continue to compete on world markets. As long as the labor standards or other social 
regulation in force reflect the desires of citizens, the costs of implementation simply reflect the trade-
off between monetary and non-monetary wealth that society has made.
2
 
What matters for rule-making is not just whether there are clear (agreed) policy-specific 
externalities and coordination failures but also whether an agreement can be enforced. The dispute 
settlement system of the GATT/WTO has been a major factor motivating suggestions that the WTO 
should be expanded to include more disciplines on policies that (are claimed to) impact on 
competitiveness.  Thus the ability of dispute settlement to deal effectively with conflicts is another 
criterion to factor in when considering binding international rules in an area (Maskus, 2002).
3
  
The WTO and regional trade agreements tend to focus on discrimination at the level of a product or 
a sector. Even where there are rules that discipline the use of general policies – such as the ban on 
export subsidies or quotas – the application of such policies is generally specific to a product or a 
sector. Much of the debate on competitiveness revolves around policies that are general in the sense 
that they affect production costs or relative prices – such as the (real) exchange rate – or affect the 
dynamics and potential growth performance of an economy as a whole. As noted, the literature 
suggests the key driver of competitiveness in the longer-term is the microeconomic incentive 
framework – the investment climate/business environment broadly defined. If this is messed up, there 
is a good case in the short run for targeting the (real) exchange rate to offset the associated 
disincentives. This is not a longer-term solution of course – there is a need to address the various 
distortions/disincentives directly, which needs to be pursued in parallel (and will of course in turn be 
reflected in the evolution of the real exchange rate). Whether the concern is a product-specific policy 
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 These issues were analyzed in depth by scholars in the 1990s—see, e.g., Bhagwati and Hudec (1996) and Lawrence et al. 
(1996). 
3
 There are different dimensions to this but a key one is that trade remedies (import protection) need to be effective in 
dealing with the effects of the policies that are deemed to violate a WTO commitment.  
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or more general economic policies that impact on the real exchange rate, the key for international 
cooperation is that there is a terms of trade externality or coordination failure. The solution to the 
former may be binding international rules, while the latter type of problem may be more effectively 
addressed through other forms of cooperation. 
What follows discusses several policy areas that seem particularly germane from a competitiveness 
perspective: macroeconomic policies that have an impact on trade, and microeconomic policies that 
promote/support the allocation of resources to dynamic/innovative firms.  
Macroeconomic policies 
Misaligned exchange rates (“currency manipulation”) can have negative spillovers and thus 
international cooperation could in principle be globally welfare improving. Defining what types of 
specific international disciplines would result in such improvements is extremely difficult however, in 
part because it may not be clear whether there is in fact a significant negative spillover, and if there is, 
what the appropriate remedy is. As has been discussed in depth in the literature on this subject there 
may be very good reasons why exchange rates diverge from “equilibrium” levels for long periods of 
time that have nothing to do with a desire to circumvent market access commitments. Nor is 
undervaluation necessarily a reflection of deliberate attempts to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor, 
mercantilist behavior aimed at generating large trade surpluses. It is important to recognize that 
current account balances reflect the difference between aggregate savings and investment in a country, 
and that these variables are driven by many factors – demographics, the financial system, social 
preferences, investment opportunities, the pension regime, etc.  Seeking rules on maximum allowable 
global current account surpluses over a given period of time or on the extent to which the real 
exchange rate can deviate from its “equilibrium rate” over a given period would constitute significant 
intrusion into economic policy in that it implies a need to commit to a willingness to intervene to 
change savings and investment rates and second guess WTO Members social policies and preferences. 
It would also imply a major shift away from the approach that has been pursued to date in international 
trade cooperation by targeting outcomes as opposed to agreeing to disciplines on specific policies that 
generate spillovers.  
Given that the IMF cannot force governments to adjust exchange rates – it can only advise – there 
have been suggestions that the WTO members should agree to stronger rules in this area that can be 
enforced through dispute settlement.  At the moment, the WTO does not provide this possibility, other 
than through GATT Article XV. This calls for WTO members to cooperate and consult with the IMF 
on matters relating to foreign exchange reserves, the balance of payments and exchange rate issues. It 
states that the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the IMF “may pursue a coordinated policy with regard to 
exchange questions” and that contracting parties “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of 
the provisions of the GATT.” The existence of the IMF helps understand why the GATT/WTO 
disciplines are not very specific: it is left to the IMF to address exchange rate misalignments. 
Mattoo and Subramanian (2009) argue that if there is a clear finding of undervaluation and this is 
clearly due to government action, this should be regarded as fully equivalent to a violation of import 
tariff bindings and the ban on export subsidies. They recognize that undervaluation can result from a 
number of factors, including fiscal and monetary policies, policies related to capital flows, taxes and 
subsidies, and intervention in foreign exchange markets, but argue there is a clear hierarchy of policy 
actions in terms of proximate causation. Prolonged one-way intervention in foreign exchange markets 
by the central bank or by government and quasi-government agencies, redenomination of domestic 
debt into foreign currency, and extensive forward market operations are policy actions that can clearly 
be identified as causes of undervaluation. In such cases, they propose that countries bring cases to the 
WTO, with the IMF – as is already the case when members invoke the GATT balance of payments 
articles  – being tasked to assess whether the member’s exchange rate is misaligned and whether this is 
a consequence of government action. Thorstensen et al. (2011) and Lima-Campos and Gil (2012) have 
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argued that WTO Members should launch countervailing duty investigations against currency 
manipulators, defined as countries with sustained exchange rate levels that are greatly depreciated as 
compared to the levels that applied when tariff concessions were negotiated.
4
 Gagnon (2012) argues 
that that WTO rules should be reformed to facilitate the use of import tariffs on the exports of 
countries found to be currency manipulators.  
There are compelling arguments why efforts to go down the path of invoking the WTO’s 
contingent protection or dispute settlement mechanisms are likely to do much more harm than good in 
terms of sustaining multilateral cooperation or addressing the underlying source of the externality. One 
reason is that it is necessary to consider the overall current account and not bilateral trade balances. 
One deficit country taking trade action against a surplus country may not do much to affect the 
balance of overall imports and exports of the two countries concerned. Moreover, as a result of the 
rapid rise in vertical specialization and intra-industry trade, much of a surplus country’s exports may 
embody imports sourced from the deficit country – so that an import surcharge by the latter may also 
negatively affect its exports. The level of the real exchange rate is not a policy instrument on which a 
government can make specific commitments. It is endogenous, and will reflect a mix of fiscal and 
monetary policies. Whether a government is engaging in deliberate undervaluation is inherently a 
subjective exercise, not least because there are different methodologies and approaches to determining 
the “equilibrium” real exchange rate, which may generate quite different benchmarks (Eden and 
Nguyen, 2012). Even if the assessment is left to the IMF—as required by GATT Article XV—it will 
be very difficult to objectively assess in a specific disputed case whether there is currency 
manipulation, and if so, to what extent a country is undercutting its trade policy commitments to 
liberalize access to its markets and/or is subsidizing its exports. There are many other objectives that 
may underpin an active monetary and exchange rate management policy that have nothing to do with 
seeking to circumvent trade policy commitments (Staiger and Sykes 2010).  
Current account surplus countries have historically never been willing to subject themselves to 
binding international disciplines. At the end of the day policies that result in large current account 
surpluses are costly to the countries pursuing such behavior as they imply suppressing domestic 
consumption.  Over time there will be endogenous pressures limiting the magnitude of sustained 
imbalances and pushing towards adjustment of the underlying policies – as has been occurring in the 
case of China. Equally important is to recognize that from a competitiveness perspective, countries 
running large, sustained current account deficits that reflect an excess of consumption over income 
need to put their own house in order—by focusing on improving both the macro- and microeconomic 
environment that determines productivity performance.  Improving product market regulation 
(reducing barriers to competition in services sectors, including network industries); permitting foreign 
ownership; lowering trade barriers; labor market reform to enhance labor mobility; eliminating fiscal 
distortions (e.g., non-renewable energy subsidies); improving educational quality and outcomes, R&D 
and innovation incentives and the quality of infrastructure; controlling the cost of healthcare; etc.  
That said, whatever one’s views, doing more to clarify, analyze and discuss what the effects are of 
prevailing policies would help to identify the extent of negative spillovers and possible actions that 
could be taken to enhance competitiveness in deficit/low productivity countries. The same is true with 
respect to the possible spillover effects on capital flows of the monetary policies that are pursued by 
large countries—e.g., the current debates about the impact on the rest of world of monetary easing by 
the US and the EU, which some countries argue generates capital inflows and thus puts pressure on 
their exchange rates/competitiveness. As argued by Irwin (2011) there is a clear case for the IMF and 
the WTO to work out how they can help defuse current and future disputes over exchange 
rate/monetary policy and, more specifically, whether agreement can be obtained on specific “rules of 
                                                     
4
 One problem in pursuing this suggestion is that the WTO requires subsidies to involve a financial contribution by the 
government and be product-specific in order to be actionable. An undervalued exchange rate will affect all exports and is 
not specific.  
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the game.” Gagnon (2012), Irwin (2011), Mattoo and Subramanian (2009) and many in the policy 
community in the United States and Europe take the view that trade retaliation should be on the table 
as a remedy if these rules are violated. This is arguably seriously misconceived as it can easily lead to 
the unraveling of the open multilateral system of trade and the predictability of the policy environment 
in which traders operate. Trade policy should not be seen as an appropriate tool to address monetary 
policy related conflicts. If countries can agree to stronger rules, given that much of the concern relates 
to the effects of the induced capital flows, taking action to tax capital inflows (raise the cost of buying 
domestic bonds or other financial instruments) is a more appropriate remedy, one that is currently 
unconstrained under the WTO and that can be implemented unilaterally by governments as an 
instrument to manage the impacts of capital flows.
5
 
Spillovers from microeconomic policies affecting competitiveness 
As noted earlier, much of what matters for longer-run competitiveness should not generate negative 
spillovers and thus does not give rise to a need for international disciplines. Potential exceptions are 
industrial policy type sector-specific interventions. This is of course is a well known issue area for 
international rule-making, as reflected in WTO disciplines on the use of export subsidies and trade 
policies that can be used to offset tariff reduction commitments such as local content requirements. 
The 2008 financial crisis gave rise to a significant increase in the use of subsidies of different types, 
some of which were aimed at stimulating demand – e.g., “cash for clunkers” programs to stimulate 
demand for automobiles – while others involved support for specific sectors (e.g., governments taking 
direct equity stakes in financial services and car companies) (see the Global Trade Alert website). 
Clearly such policy interventions affected competition on the relevant markets concerned. Looking 
forward there may be more recourse to subsidy-type policies as traditional border trade policies 
(tariffs, quotas) have become much less effective in supporting domestic economic activity as a result 
of global production fragmentation and the organization of production in international value chains. 
Rather than restrict access to markets – which raises the costs of imports that increasingly are direct 
inputs into export production – governments may respond to pressures to create/safeguard jobs at 
home by providing subsidies to local economic activity, whether de jure or de facto.  
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) prohibits export subsidies 
and establishes conditions under which domestic subsidies that cause adverse effects for other WTO 
Members can be challenged or countervailed. The WTO does not restrict the ability of governments to 
use subsidies or to allocate subsidies to domestic producers only—Art. III:8 GATT explicitly excludes 
subsidies from the national treatment rule. To be actionable subsidies must be specific, entail a cost to 
government and create a benefit for firms. Adverse effects are defined in trade terms: the subsidies 
create adverse trade effects for other WTO members. The SCM agreement does not specify any types 
of specific subsidies that are permitted and thus are not actionable.
6
 The problem that arises is that 
subsidies may be an appropriate instrument to address market failures – along lines of the case for an 
undervalued exchange rate to offset domestic distortions – but may give rise to international 
competitiveness spillovers.  At the moment the focus of WTO rules is only on the latter; it is irrelevant 
as far as the WTO is concerned what the subsidy aims to achieve. In general, as is well known, a 
subsidy can be an efficient instrument to offset some types of market failures. If a subsidy 
offsets/corrects market failures in principle it cannot be held to create a negative spillover on foreign 
                                                     
5
 Restrictions on capital flows can play a useful role in coping with surges of capital inflows and the associated spillovers 
(asset bubbles; potential financial instability) that are in part the result of monetary policies in large trading partners (see 
e.g., Magud and Reinhardt, 2006; Ostry et al. 2010; and Canuto and Cavallari, 2012). Of course, this is not a panacea: 
one country’s success in using capital controls will increase the difficulty for other nations doing the same (Committee on 
International Economic Policy and Reform, 2011), pointing to the need for greater communication between authorities 
and justification of the measures taken (Canuto et al, 2012). 
6
 A provision that did so or some specific subsidies was time-bound and lapsed in 2001. 
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interests and or raise a competitiveness issue. The problem is that the WTO ignores what a subsidy is 
aimed to achieve—the focus is only on trade effects. If a country has made tariff commitments and 
subsequently decides to use a policy instrument such as a specific subsidy it may have an adverse 
trade effect on trading partners and thus be actionable even if the sole objective is to correct a 
domestic distortion.
7
  
The WTO makes allowances for countries to invoke a general exceptions provision (Article XX 
GATT) to use otherwise prohibited trade policies as long as these do not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign goods and are necessary to achieve a regulatory objective (e.g., protect health 
and safety; conserve non-renewable natural resources), but this provision does not (cannot) apply to 
non-prohibited subsidies (as these are not disciplined by the SCM agreement, which only lays out 
when domestic subsidies are actionable) and cannot be used to justify specific subsidies because of the 
non-discrimination requirement (Mavroidis, 2012). Moreover, an exception will not insulate a country 
against countervailing actions (Howse, 2010). As a result, governments may be pressed to take 
unilateral action against imports produced by firms that are deemed to have benefited from subsidies 
whatever the rationale or effect of the subsidies beyond trade. Thus, “competitiveness concerns” may 
conflict with the objective of addressing market failures and give rise to pressures for countervailing 
action by other countries.  
A key policy issue is whether and what types of specific subsidies motivated on the basis of market 
failures, should be permitted. For example, should free allowances made under emission trading 
schemes be actionable? Feed-in tariff programs that pay renewable energy producers a premium for 
green energy generation? Given the rapid increase in green tax/subsidy-related trade disputes and 
countermeasures (antidumping and countervail cases for solar panels; feed-in tariffs; the EU decision 
to extend the ETS to all airlines landing in its territory) international agreement on what constitutes 
‘acceptable’ targeted policies that are beneficial for the environment (address market failures) and 
should be non-actionable would help reduce the scope for globally welfare-reducing actions taken 
under the banner of competitiveness (Henschke, 2012).  The same is true of other subsidy policies that 
can be justified as aiming to offset specific market failures. A case in point is the treatment of special 
economic zones (SEZs) and the scope for SEZs to fall foul of the ban on export subsidization. Just as 
deliberate targeting of a competitive exchange rate may be a short term instrument to offset the effects 
of a bad investment climate, SEZs can be effective instruments to insulate firms from an unsupportive 
business environment that impedes investment in tradable industries.   
4. Improving global governance 
A common theme of the literature on competitiveness is to identify a set of policies that can be 
pursued by governments to enhance the long term productivity performance of the economy.  A 
feature of virtually all the literature is that the focus is on countries. While there is much cross-country 
comparison and analysis of policy indicators and outcomes, there is however mostly little attention 
given to the potential for negative pecuniary spillovers, let alone empirical estimates of how large 
spillover effects are. One reason for this is that what drives competitiveness is mostly determined by 
national governments and polities—what other countries do certainly may have impacts on 
competition on global markets but in many, if not most, countries it is the national investment climate 
broadly defined that is the main determinant of the ability of national firms to compete effectively on 
world markets.  The exceptions are the literatures on “industrial policy” (targeted intervention that 
impacts on production incentives for specific industries or economic activities) and on “global 
imbalances” (the strand that focuses on “export mercantilism”, i.e., deliberate exchange rate 
undervaluation aimed at sustaining large current account surpluses.  
                                                     
7
 One result is that the rules may distort what governments are willing to commit to in the WTO. See Bagwell and Staiger 
(2006) for an analysis of the incentive effects of existing WTO rules on subsidies. 
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In both these areas matters are not by any means clear-cut when it comes to the global welfare 
effects of specific policies and the magnitude (or even sign) of negative spillovers. As discussed 
above, there is a serious tension between concerns about the competition effects of industrial policies 
and the need for intervention to address market failures. One can (and should) question whether 
policies do in fact address such failures but this is not to deny that policy intervention can improve 
allocative (and dynamic) efficiency.  As argued above, there is a clear case for revisiting the current 
WTO rules in the area of subsidies. On the macroeconomic  sources of potential spillovers, there are 
numerous possible rationales for countries to have current account surpluses – including self-insurance 
against exogenous shocks and “sudden credit stops”; financial repression implemented as part of an 
economic development strategy; regulation of product and factor markets that reduces competition and 
raises costs of entry and operations, thereby lowering investment; limited financial market 
development and weak governance that generates excessive corporate savings; or weak social 
protection (safety nets; health insurance; pension systems) that induces high precautionary savings by 
households. 
The underlying drivers of large current account imbalances are likely to impede long-run growth 
and thus are unlikely to be sustained in the long run. Rebalancing must involve changes in economic 
structure. The associated “competitiveness agenda” overlaps to a significant extent with the need for 
“structural reforms” to increase competition in services sectors (health; financial services (pension 
systems), professional and business services, transport and logistics, as well as product and labour 
market regulation. Developing countries face significant difficulties in designing such reforms, in part 
because of concerns about the realization of regulatory objectives. There are multiple players with 
different objectives within governments that have a role in setting regulation. Moreover, efficient 
provision of services often involves a cluster of activities that cuts across multiple regulatory agencies, 
making it more difficult to determine what is needed to improve competitiveness. 
These are areas where it will be difficult to agree to binding rules on the substance of regulation 
through negotiations, even in cases where there are negative spillovers/terms of trade effects. A 
problem for international cooperation is that frequently policies and their effects are not transparent – 
not enough is known about extant policies and their impacts. More systematic collection of 
information on relevant policies and objective analysis of their effects on competitiveness and any 
spillovers is a pre-condition for any effort to arrive at a common understanding of any specific 
situation. This is in part being done by organizations like the OECD and the World Bank, but it 
arguably needs to become much more central to the work of the WTO. Bolstering voluntary 
mechanisms that are open to all countries that focus on the identification of beneficial structural 
reforms, including in services sectors, from a national self-interest perspective could help prepare 
ground for possible enforceable agreements on specific policies once there is a common understanding 
that this would benefit all participating countries. 
Hoekman and Mattoo (2010) suggest the formation of “knowledge platforms” that would act as 
vehicles through which countries can assess/analyse the impacts of current policy regimes and identify 
beneficial reforms and the investments needed to implement them. Such platforms would connect 
stakeholders to different sources of expertise – local, regional, global; facilitate knowledge exchange; 
build on existing networks of regulators and industry associations; and connect with both the donor 
community for support for implementation of reforms in developing countries and the business 
community – which has a direct stake in pro-competitive reforms and needs to play an active role in 
monitoring progress in implementing reforms and holding governments accountable for results. While 
undoubtedly a complex, resource-intensive, time-consuming exercise, shifting the focus of 
international more in this direction is arguably a necessary condition for “ownership” and political 
support for putting in place policies that will enhance competitiveness.  
The incorporation of such forms of cooperation is sometimes found in PTAs. Often this takes the 
form of provisions to provide technical and other forms of assistance, and the establishment of 
mechanisms for the exchange of information, interactions between business 
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associations/investors/civil society groups, and non-economic forms of cooperation (e.g., student or 
cultural exchanges). PTAs often also create a variety of official bodies that are tasked with 
implementation of the agreement in specific areas and that can act as mechanisms through which the 
regulators and other officials from the participating countries establish working relationships. One 
lesson from successful North-South PTAs is that the prospects for the agreements to enhance the 
welfare of developing country signatories are improved if the focus extends beyond market access 
(i.e., terms-of-trade externalities) and government-to-government interaction. Including 
complementary measures that aim at improving the domestic regulatory environment; bolstering 
related institutions; the provision of technical and financial assistance; and active engagement by the 
private sector in surveillance and enforcement of commitments is equally if not more important. 
5. Concluding remarks  
Although the rapid increase in global integration and production-sharing (international supply chains) 
means that trade policy is likely to feature much less prominently in the toolbox of governments in the 
future than it has in the past, other instruments such as monetary, fiscal or industrial (sector) policies 
continue to have an important role to play. These are appropriate instruments for governments to use 
in the pursuit of growth and development goals, but they can have beggar-thy-neighbor features and 
thus generate international tensions. Addressing such conflicts – which in part will be the consequence 
of successful pursuit of export-led growth and thus be difficult to disentangle from more general 
competitive pressures – in a cooperative manner is important both to prevent recourse to unilateral 
trade ‘retaliation’ by trading partners and to allow those countries that are most in need of effective 
pro-active policies to use them without fear of negative reactions from the rest of the world. 
For there to be a rationale for countries to negotiate internationally binding rules on specific 
policies, they need to generate terms of trade spillovers. This also applies to policies that impact on the 
competiveness of firms in a country: the question is to what extent such policies generate negative 
pecuniary spillovers. The literature on the determinants of competitiveness suggests that policies and 
institutions that support the emergence of productive firms and boost overall total factor productivity 
do not generate negative spillovers. What this suggests from a global governance perspective is that 
mechanisms are needed that generate greater transparency and facilitate learning about what works 
and what matters for competitiveness. This is the focus of work by many organizations, including the 
IMF, the OECD, and the World Bank. It is not however a focal point for the WTO. Thus, one 
conclusion suggested by the discussion in this paper is that the WTO membership – the primary 
international organization where competitiveness concerns will arise and can be addressed – consider 
doing more to promote such exchanges. 
Deep integration based on internationally agreed, binding norms that are applied on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all traders may enhance global welfare. But, the need for deeper integration 
on most issues that impact on competitiveness is arguably limited. Frequently, shallow integration will 
be a more powerful instrument – i.e., competition between regulatory regimes that reflect national 
circumstances.  In areas such as social regulation and macroeconomic policies it will be very difficult 
to achieve deep integration (coordination or harmonization of policy). A necessary condition is a 
common understanding of how regulation/policy affects competitiveness. This can be pursued via 
creation of processes through which governments and domestic stakeholders can identify the effects of 
policies and alternatives that are likely to enhance competitiveness. Entry barriers such as non-
recognition of professional certification and qualifications and conformity assessment regimes that 
imply redundant costs for foreign suppliers are examples of regulatory areas where domestic reform 
can do much to reduce to foster greater competitiveness. Binding international law that spells out the 
substance of the relevant regulatory requirements is not likely to be feasible or desirable, however. A 
focus on agreement on good regulatory principles (process- and transparency related) and creation of 
mechanisms through which firms can interact with governments to identify market-segmenting 
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impacts of prevailing policies and less-trade restricting alternatives is likely to be a more productive 
path. 
The same applies to macroeconomic and monetary policies, where a first step should also be more 
open discussion and specific analysis of the spillover effects of policies. Seeking to agree on binding 
rules seems very unlikely to be feasible—it is difficult to imagine large countries ever agreeing to be 
subject to binding legal disciplines outside of the framework of a monetary union (and even then the 
Eurozone illustrates that the degree of integration that is required is very far-reaching).  Deficit nations 
are ultimately subject to market discipline, while surplus countries confront “only” political market 
discipline—insofar as large, sustained surpluses that are the result of deliberate policies, governments 
will be subject to political pressure from their citizens if the costs in terms of consumption and 
investment returns forgone become too high. It is important in this connection to recognize that the 
recent period that has given rise to macroeconomic policy-induced competitiveness concerns has been 
rather unique in that it is associated with China’s re-integration into the global economy. This has been 
very beneficial to China as well as the world as a whole, but the rapidity and magnitude of the 
resulting shifts in trade shares and relative incomes has been unprecedented, giving rise to major 
adjustment costs for other countries. However, it has also created great opportunities as the effective 
size of the world economy has increased substantially. The policy challenges of leveraging this 
opportunity into sustained higher growth are primarily domestic—putting in place a supportive 
business environment and investment climate that generates high quality jobs for citizens. 
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